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Rosemary Cairns Way*

The Law of Police Authority:
The McDonald Commission
and the McLeod Report

I. Introduction**
By the summer of 1977 it was apparent that the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police had engaged in unauthorized break-ins and
unlawful seizure in their zeal to protect the national security.,
In response to growing public criticism and concern, then
Solicitor-General Francis Fox announced the government's
intention to establish a commission of inquiry into the scope
and frequency of certain investigative techniques of the national
police force. 2 The mandate of the McDonald Commission was
to investigate RCMP procedures that were "not authorized or
provided for by law". 3 Although the July appointment of the

Commission resulted in an announced moratorium on certain
practices within the Force, 4 the disturbing revelations continued.
By the end of 1977, the catalogue of alleged wrongdoing included

*LL.B., The University of Western Ontario 1985.
**The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Robert Solomon,
Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. Professor Solomon's thorough
knowledge, his enthusiastic and constructive criticism, and his support were
generously given. In addition I would like to acknowledge the research funding
provided through the Law Reform Commission of Canada's summer internship
programme in the summer of 1984.
1.See, for example; The Toronto Star, May 23, 1977 "Metro Police Probing
RCMP Praxis Break-in Role" at A2, The Globe and Mail, May 27, 1977
"Three Policemen Plead Guilty to '72 APLQ Break-in" at I, The Toronto
Star, June 21, 1977 "Break-in and Cover-up Push Ottawa to Brink of Inquiry
into RCMP" at Al, The Montreal Star, June 20, 1977 "Unresolved RCMP
Scandal" at A6, The Toronto Star, June 21, 1977 "National Inquiry Needed
on RCMP" at B4, The Globe and Mail, June 25, 1977 "Canada Mad; where
MPPs go to Jail and RCMP are Promoted" at 6.
2. Can. H of C Debates (July 6, 1977) at 7365-66.
3. Order-in-Council P.C. 1977-1911, passed on July 6, 1977, paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) pursuant to the authority granted by Part I of the Inquires Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-13.
4. Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, Second Report-Volume 1,Freedom and Security
Under the Law, Ministry of Supply and Services Canada: August, 1981 at
11.
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break-ins, illegal wiretapping, theft, barn-burning and a lengthy
cover-up.5
Four years and some 12 million dollars later, 6 the Commission
submitted its final report to the government. The 2,000 page
document 7 contains an exhaustive analysis of the structure and
problems of the security system and detailed recommendations
for the future. The central thesis of the Report is that the police
must at all times operate within the law and within the ambit
of clearly delineated common law or statutory authority.
The response of the government to the conclusions and
recommendations of the McDonald Commission was, from the
outset, unenthusiastic.8 The Report was delayed for seven
months before release to the public. During this time, the
Department of Justice commissioned two legal opinions for
virtually simultaneous release. These documents, written by
retired Supreme Court Justice Wishart Spence and Toronto
lawyer Robert Wright dispute McDonald's central thesis and
suggest instead that it is not always a crime for the police to
break the law in the line of duty. Nearly two years later, in
June of 1983, yet another legal opinion was published by the
5. See, for example The Montreal Star, October 28, 1977 "Fox admits RCMP
raid on PQ offices" at Al, The Toronto Star, October 31, 1977 "Mounties
burned Quebec farm, stole dynamite in 1973" at A4, The Montreal Star,
November 10, 1977 "Fox admits Mounties opened mail" at Al, The Globe
and Mail, November 1, 1977 "RCMP Crime; frightening is dereliction of
duty of Solicitor's General and Prime Minister" at 4.
6. The Winnipeg Free Press, March 11,1982 "Independent Opinions called
Amazing, Amusing" at 14.
7. In fact the conclusions of the Commission are contained in three separate
reports: First Report - Security and Information, published in October,
1979, 75 pp.; Second Report, Volumes I and 2 - Freedom and Security
under the Law, published in August, 1981, 1300 pp., and; Third Report Certain RCMP Activities and the Question of Governmental Knowledge,
published in August, 1981, 530 pp. This analysis will concentrate on the Second
Report - Volume 1.
8. See, for example; The Globe and Mail, March 16, 1981 "McDonald Report
on RCMP a ringing indictment" at 6, The Globe and Mail, August 26, 1981
"McDonald Commission Raps RCMP for Institutionalized Lawbreaking"
at 1,The Globe and Mail, August 27, 1981 "RCMP Will Continue Breaking
the Law - Kaplan" at 1,The Montreal Gazette, August 28, 1981 "RCMP
Acts are Legal-Chretien" at 1,"Ottawa Upstages McDonald Report" at 25,
The Globe and Mail, August 28, 1981 "Ottawa Weak-willed on the RCMP
Inquiry" at 7, The Globe and Mail, January 16, 1982 "Criminal Law Quarterly
Rebuts McDonald Report Critics" at 11, The Winnipeg Free Press, March
11, 1982 "Independent Opinions Called Amazing, Amusing" at 14.
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federal department of the Solicitor-General. The Report of the
Federal/ Provincial Committee of Criminal Justice Officials with
respect to the McDonald Commission (hereinafter referred to
as the McLeod Report) argues that the McDonald legal analysis
is incorrect and proposes a substantially different approach to
the law of police authority.
The conflict exemplified by the McLeod Report and the
McDonald Commission raises a number of fundamental issues.
The roots of the debate lie in our approach to criminal justice
and the relationship between the individual and the state. The
tradition of the common law is to provide the police with strictly
limited authority within a broad ambit of duty. Infringements
on individual freedom must be specifically and unambiguously
authorized by a rule of positive law. The laws of arrest and
search are examples of this authority-based approach to police
power. This is the analysis adopted by McDonald with which
McLeod is in fundamental disagreement. The McLeod Report
suggests an expediency-based law of police powers with an afterthe-fact test of justification. McLeod's analysis is based on an
essential misconception which equates duty and responsibility
with authority and power.
The very existence of a document such as the McLeod Report
is perhaps as disturbing as its content. The authors of the Report
are senior criminal justice officials at both the federal and
provincial level.' 0 By actively soliciting critical responses to the
McDonald Commission Report, the government has effectively
involved the upper echelons of the criminal justice system in
political advocacy. The role of these senior officials is to
impartially uphold the existing law and not to advocate in the
political forum for a substantial expansion of police powers.
9. Published by the Communication Division under the authority of the
Honourable Bob Kaplan, P.C., M.P., Solicitor-General of Canada, June,
1983. The authors of the McLeod Report include; D.H. Christie, Q.C.,
Associate Deputy Minister, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, Peter Engstad, Director
of Law Enforcement Policy, Ministry of the Solicitor-General, Ottawa, Alan
Filmer, Q.C., Assistant Deputy Minister, Ministry of the Attorney-General,

Victoria, B.C., Serge Kujawa, Q.C., Associate Deputy Minister, Dept. of
Attorney-General, Regina, Saskatchewan, Y. Roslak, Q.C., Director, Special
Services, Dept. of Attorney-General, Edmonton, Alberta, Howard Morton,

Q.C., Director, Crown Law Office, Criminal, Ministry of the AttorneyGeneral, Toronto and R.M. McLeod, Q.C. (Chairman) Deputy SolicitorGeneral, Ministry of the Solicitor-General, Toronto.

10. Id.
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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the common
law, authority-based approach to police powers is the correct
one both in terms of legal analysis and policy. The paper will
begin with a brief description of the McLeod/ McDonald debate.
The main body of the paper will be devoted to a consideration
of the law of police authority. This will entail a discussion of
the powers, duties and responsibilities of the police in Canada
today and an extensive analysis of the relevant case law. Once
the Canadian law of police authority is understood it will be
possible to consider the McLeod Report both as a piece of
legal scholarship and as an advocacy document.
It is anticipated that the legal analysis will lead to two
conclusions. First, that the approach advocated by the McLeod
Report is significantly flawed. Second, that the traditional
common law approach to police powers which is predicated
on the assumption of individual freedom is the appropriate limit
on the police in contemporary Canadian society.

PART 1: The Genesis and Nature of the Debate
1. The Facts: The Disclosures of 1976 and 1977
In March of 1976 former RCMP corporal Robert Samson was
convicted of placing three sticks of dynamite outside the
Montreal home of Melvyn Dobrin, president of Steinberg's
Incorporated. The resulting explosion cost Mr. Dobrin $1500,
and Mr. Samson seven years. During his testimony Samson
outlined his involvement with a 1972 break-in at the Agence
du Presse Libre du Quebec (APLQ), a left-wing news agency.
On the day of Samson's conviction then Solicitor-General
Warren Allmand announced an RCMP investigation into the
alleged break-in. A year later RCMP Chief Superintendent in
charge of security and intelligence in Quebec, Donald Cobb,
and two police inspectors were charged with criminal
responsibility for the unauthorized break-in.
The APLQ disclosure was the first in a series of shocking
revelations of illegal and unauthorized RCMP activity dating
back as far as the 1950s. Although two commissions of inquiry
had been established by the end of 1977, the outcome of the
crisis which Corporal Samson perhaps unwittingly set into
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motion remains uncertain.'' At the very least it is clear that
the events of 1976 and 1977 have forced both politicians and
the public to admit that institutionalized police wrongdoing
in pursuit of perceived goals has occurred.
The three officers charged in the APLQ break-in pleaded
guilty on May 27, 1977 and on June 16 they were granted an
absolute discharge. Although Solicitor-General Francis Fox
downplayed the raid as "one act of misjudgment" 2 public
reaction was mixed.' 3 On the day of the discharge, the Quebec
government announced the establishment of the Keable
Commission to investigate the entire affair.' 4 Pressure on the
federal government to do the same increased as allegations of
a lengthy cover-up, intentional ministerial blindness and another
break-in at the Toronto offices of Praxis Corporation began
to emerge. Editorial response was harsh as the following excerpt
from the Montreal Star indicates:
Those who urge that, in the name of national security, police
must be given extra-ordinary powers or the right to break
the law when they feel it necessary, argue that those put
in authority over us have such a profound sense of uprightness
and responsibility that there is no need to constrain them
by the rule of law. This story of a squalid burglary and 5five
years of cover-up show how feeble those assurances are.'
By July 6 the federal government had agreed to establish a

II. Recently, legislation has been enacted which is specifically directed to
the area of national security. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act,
Vol. 7, No. 4, The Canada Gazette, Part Ill was assented to on June 28th,
1984. Section 12 sets out the main duty of the newly established service.
s. 12: The Service shall collect .. . and analyse and retain information
and intelligence respecting activities that may, on reasonable grounds be
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada.
However, the broader question of the extent to which the police should be
allowed to "break the law" in the line of duty remains unresolved. The existence
of documents such as the McLeod Report attests to the political uncertainty
which continues to becloud the issue.
12. The Montreal Star, May 27, 1977 "Trudeau denies raid cover-up" at

Al.
13. See, supra note I.
14. The Montreal Star, June 16, 1977 "PQ to probe police break-in" at Al.
Rapport de la Commission d'enqufte sur des op&rations policires en territoire
qu6b6cois (Qu6bec: Gouvernement du Qu6bec, 1981).
15. The Montreal Star, June 20, 1977 "Unresolved RCMP Scandal" at A6.
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royal commission, but unfortunately for the RCMP the string
of damning disclosures continued.
In August it was alleged that the RCMP had, in the early
1970s, opened files on members of the New Democratic Party
because of fears of communist infiltration. In September the
CBC investigative documentary, the Fifth Estate, revealed that
illegal wiretaps and break-ins were a standard practice, approved
at the highest levels. The investigative team quoted an RCMP
officer as saying:
Break-ins are common practice .... Twenty-five percent of
them probably are fishing trips with no real hard evidence
at the time. We are taught how to pick a lock and are issued
a little case with all the picking equipment that you carry
6
in your suit pocket.'
Late October brought perhaps the most serious allegations a January 1973 break-in at the Montreal headquarters of the
Parti Qu6b6cois without search warrants or other legal
authority; a contrived theft of dynamite engineered to discredit
the separatist movement; and the deliberate burning of a barn
which was supposedly a meeting place for separatist sympathizers. In November Solicitor-General Fox confirmed the
existence of two RCMP investigative programmes - Operation
Cathedral, which had illegally opened private mail between 1959
and 1976, and Operation 300, which had performed illegal breakins for some twenty years. The Solicitor-General insisted
throughout that the motives of those involved in the systematic
and institutionalized illegality were of the "highest order". By
the end of 1977 the catalogue of RCMP wrongdoings was
apparently complete and the press and public settled down to
await the conclusions of the royal commision's inquiry.
2. The McDonald Commission: Its mandateand its conclusions
On July 6, 1977 the McDonald Commission was established
by an order-in-council, its mandate to investigate RCMP
procedures which were "not authorized or provided for by
law". 17 The Commission submitted three reports to the
government: Security and Information, released in October of
16. The Globe and Mail, Sept. 21, 1977 "Wiretaps, break-ins by RCMP
common - RCMP officers on CBC's Fifth Estate" at 4.
17. See, supra note 3.
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1979, which dealt with the disclosure of information whose
release may be prejudicial to national security; Freedom and
Security under the Law, released in August, 1981, which
examined the existing system and the institutionalized
wrongdoing within that system and suggested a plan for the
future, and; Certain RCMP Activities and the Question of
Governmental Knowledge, released in August, 198J, which
provided a more detailed examination of specific incidents of
alleged wrongdoing. My article is primarily concerned with the
second report which contains the Commission's analysis of the
law of police powers.
The Commission interpreted its mandate to require an
investigation into acts which were offences under the Criminal
Code or under other federal or provincial statutes, acts which
were tortious, and acts which were beyond the statutory
authority of the RCMP.18 Not surprisingly, the Commission
based its analysis on a fundamental and ancient principle of
our legal system, namely, the rule of law. The Report is premised
on the assertion that the police must operate within the law
and any infringement of either common law or statute must
be specifically authorized. The Commission's conclusions with
regard to the RCMP practice of surreptitous entry are illustrative
of their approach.
... we must assert emphatically that it is wrong and
unacceptable that any Canadian police force should act on
the assumption that its members need only be concerned to
avoid criminal offences: there are other illegalities. The policy
of the RCMP has reflected an attitude that entries without
consent or warrant or some other positive legal support are
permissible because no criminal offence is thereby committed,
as if that disposed of the matter. Leaving aside the few
provinces that have Petty Trespass Acts, the police are faced
with the "illegality" of the law of trespass ....

The law of

trespass is not to be brushed aside as of no account in deciding
force policy. A trespass is a "wrong". It is wrongful to adopt
policies that countenance and encourage trespass. If the law
of trespass is an obstacle to the effective detection of crime,
the law should be changed by the appropriate legislative body.
Pending change, the law must be respected. 19
18. See, supra note 4 at 17. In addition the Commission stated that it "did
not intend to ignore the moral and ethical implications of police investigative

procedures" (also at 17).
19. Id. at 122-23.
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3. The government's response
The task of the McDonald Commission was an unenviable one
given the nature of the alleged illegality and the fact that it
had gone unchecked and unnoticed for years. Political unease
20
with the work of the Commission was apparent from the outset.
The response of the government to the completed Report
provides eloquent testimony to their dissatisfaction with any
attempt to curtail RCMP investigative techniques. The
government held the Report for seven months while actively
soliciting legal opinions. In March of 1981 the editorial staff
of the Globe and Mail wrote that the federal government was
busy "scrubbing it [the Report] behind the ears and excising
any lines which might compromise Ottawa's free-form concept
of national security".21
In August, 1981 when the first volume of the Report was
finally released, senior ministers were quick to defend the
Force.22 Solicitor-General Kaplan insisted that the police should
have the discretion to break the law when it seemed reasonable.
When asked to elaborate the Minister replied: "I can't be very
categorical about it. It's a matter of reasonable necessity in
23
a particular case".
Although three Reports were solicited by the government
in response to the McDonald Commission, this paper will focus
on the McLeod Report, a 110 page document published in June
of 1983. The McLeod Report purports to respond to the
McDonald Commission in two ways; (1) by setting out a general
approach to the law of police powers, and (2) by making
recommendations with regard to specific investigative
techniques. The Report's approach to the law of police powers
20. See notes 5 and 8.
21. The Globe and Mail March 16, 1981 "McDonald Report on RCMP
a ringing indictment" at 6.
22. See, supra note 5. It is also interesting to note the defences suggested
by senior ministers in 1977 as the illegalities were uncovered. For example,
The Globe and Mail, October 29, 1977 "Police can sometimes break law
technically, PM says" at I, The Globe and Mail, November 3, 1977 "Can't
tell Mounties how to conduct their daily operation - PM" at 1,The Vancouver
Sun, November 3, 1977 "Mounties need special tools to guarantee security
- PM" at A13, The Globe and Mail, November 7, 1977 "Fox suggests law
change to allow RCMP to conduct illegal acts" at 8.
23. The Globe and Mail, August 27, 1981 "RCMP will continue breaking

law-

Kaplan" at 1.
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is supported by a fifty page legal analysis which will be the
focus of this discussion.
4. The McLeod Approach
The McLeod Report, while accepting the principle that the police
must, at all times, obey the law, differs from the McDonald
Commission in its interpretation of this principle. The authors
believe it is necessary to look for the existence of specific criminal
prohibitions in order to determine if the police are acting
unlawfully. The Report relies on the fact that police officers
have responsibilities and commensurate authority not vested
in other citizens in order to justify its conclusion that in certain
circumstances a police officer may infringe recognized rights
of liberty and property. In order to ascertain when such
infringements are acceptable it is initially necessary to examine
the "ordinary law of the realm in a global sense" 24 and in
particular the duties, responsibilities, rights and privileges of
a police officer. The Report identifies a number of general
policing responsibilities such as preserving the peace, preventing
crime and protecting life and property while commenting on
the inadvisability of strictly delimiting the ambit of police duty.
Having established the existence of a duty, the lawfulness
of a particular police action is to be judged on the basis of
the test enunciated in R. v. Waterfield, a 1964 English Court
of Appeal decision. 25 The test, as set out in the Report involves
a three step process. In order to determine whether a police
officer is breaking the law it is necessary to:
(1) consider what the police officer was actually doing and
in particular whether his conduct was prima facie an
unlawful interference with a person's liberty or property,
(2) if so, it is then relevant to consider whether,
(a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any
duty imposed by statute or recognized at common
law, and
(b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope
of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of powers
26
associated with that duty.
24. See, supra note 9 at 3.
25. R. v. Waterfield, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.).
26. See, supra note 9 at 4.
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The application of the test is based on the assumption that
in certain circumstances the existence of a police duty will
necessarily imply a correlative power. In other words, the Report
appears to suggest that the authority to unlawfully interfere
with a person's liberty or property may exist simply because
the police officer is acting within the scope of his duty. This
exercise of implied power is judged after the fact, based on
whether or not it was "justifiable". The Report recognizes that
such a post-facto procedure will not always provide sufficient
pre-event certainty. However, the authors believe that the test
will enable the articulation of guidelines which will be sufficient
27
to deal with most situations.
The Report advocates a "global" approach to the law 28 in
which the acceptable parameters of a police officer's acts and
omissions are different from those of an ordinary citizen
precisely because the law has imposed special obligations with
concurrent authority on the officer. The Report concludes that
the Waterfield test, as interpreted by them, has been
incorporated into the global law of the realm, providing a
reasonable, yet effective means within the rule of law to discharge
29
the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the police.
The authors of the McLeod Report assert that duty implies
authority provided the use of that authority is justified. This
assertion is clearly in error. A post-facto analysis of official
action based on some vague concept of expediency flies in the
face of the rule of law. The common law has long recognized
that the exercise of police power which infringes protected rights
must be based on specific legal authority. The police, however
onerous their task, are not above the law. The McDonald
Commission, in embracing this approach is in accord with both
the traditions of the common law and the needs of contemporary
Canadian society. The debate between the two Reports reflects
fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of police
power and as a necessary result, on the relationship of the
individual and the state.

27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 14. This is in contrast to the "aspect" approach of the McDonald

Commission, an apparently significant distinction which is never fully
explained.
29. Id. at 50.
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PART I1: The Law of Police Authority
i. Introduction
In order to understand the law of police authority it is necessary
to make an initial and crucial distinction between duty and
authority. Like the McLeod Report, much of the writing in
this area and a number of decisions have failed to grasp the
fundamental difference between a police officer acting in
accordance with authority and one who is performing his duty.
Webster's English Dictionary defines duty as "an action, task
required by or relating to one's occupation or position".
Authority is defined as follows: "The power or right to give
commands, enforce obedience, take action, or make final
decisions; jurisdiction". Canadian policing statutes speak in
terms of duty and that duty is expressed in the widest possible
terms, i.e. the duty to preserve the peace, or to prevent crime.
Authority-granting statutes like the Criminal Code are narrowly
circumscribed in order to limit and clearly define the police
officer's power to coerce certain behaviour. Once the distinction
between duty and authority is understood the analysis of any
impugned police action is straightforward. If the conduct
infringes recognized rights it must be specifically authorized.
The existence of a general duty becomes irrelevant. By confusing
these concepts the authors of the McLeod Report imply that
duty may often equal authority. Semantically speaking this is
unlikely, legally it is simply untrue.
In order to clarify the Canadian law of police authority this
part is divided into two sections: the first will examine the present
statutory regime and its links with the common law and the
second will discuss the case law. There are a number of statutory
privileges accorded a police officer who is acting within his
authority. Section 25 of the Criminal Code provides:
s.25(1) Everyone who is required or authorized by law to
do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law
...is, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, justified
in doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using
as much force as is necessary for that purpose.
This section is predicated on the existence of an authority at
law to act and is not phrased in terms of duty. As such it
affords protection for the use of reasonable force in respect
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of required or authorized acts. 30 Similarly, s.26(2) of the
Interpretation Act has been advanced as a general defence for
certain investigative procedures.

s.26(2): Where power is given to a person, officer or
functionary, to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing,
all such powers shall be deemed to be also given as are
necessary to enable the person, officer 3or functionary to do
or enforce the doing of the act or thing. '
Clearly, the section is relevant only when authority exists.
Policing statutes do not create authority, they simply enunciate
32
duties. Unless and until authority exists, s.26(2) is irrelevant.
In addition the common law defence of necessity may be
available for individual incidents of alleged lawbreaking. 33 These
30. This approach was expressed by Dickson, J. (as he then was) with whom
three members of the Supreme Court agreed in Eccles v. Bourque (1974),

19 C.C.C. (2d) 129 at 130-31. The Alberta Court of Appeal also adopted
this analysis in Reference re an Application for an Authorization (1983),
10 C.C.C. (3d) I, 5 D.L.R. (4th) 601, 50 A.R. 1. The Reference case was
appealed to the Supreme Court which has recently released its decision. In
the Interception of Private Communications Reference (1985), 56 N.R. Part
I, 43 at 54 Dickson C.J.C writing for the minority reiterates his position.
"Section 25(1) does not augment the powers of the police beyond those
otherwise given to them by the Criminal Code or at common law." The
reasons of the majority, expressed in the companion case of R. v. Lyons
(1985), 56 N.R. Part 1, 6 at 34 are not based on s. 25(1).
31. Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.1-23. s.26(2).
32. See Colet v. The Queen, [1981] 19 C.R. 84 at 92 (S.C.C.). Reference
re an Application, supra note 30 at 4-5, and the Interception Reference, supra
note 30 at 56-57. But note the majority reasons of Estey, J. in R. v. Lyons,
supra note 30 at 34-36.
33. The availability of the defence of necessity depends on the particular
fact situation involved. Clearly, necessity is not a defence for a procedure
adopted as a matter of official policy and repeated in a number of different
circumstances. The defence was rejected as long ago as 1765 in the decision
in Entick v. Carrington(1765), 19 State Tr. 1029 at 1066, 95 E.R. 807 (K.B.).
With respect to the arguments of state necessity, or a distinction that
has been aimed at between state officers and others, the common law
does not understand that kind of reasoning nor do our books take note
of any such distinctions.
See also Morgentalerv. The Queen (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 449 at 477 (S.C.C.).
At page 497 Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was) writes:
If it does exist it can go no further than to justify non-compliance in
urgent situations of clear and imminent peril when compliance with the
law is demonstrably impossible. No system of positive law can recognize
any principle which would entitle a person to violate the law because
on his view the law conflicted with some higher social value.
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potential justifications will be discussed only peripherally since
their application depends only upon a correct interpretation
of the relevant law based on a clear understanding of the duty/
authority analysis presented here. Although the existence of
these privileges may make it less factually likely that a police
officer will be convicted of breaking the law, they have no effect
on the fundamental common law theory that police powers
are authority-based.
2. The CanadianStatutory Regime
The police in Canada today are primarily creatures of statute.
Legislative enactments at the federal and provincial level provide
for the composition, administration and structure of the various
police forces. In addition, the statutes impose certain duties
on the police which are consistent with their traditional
obligations at common law. For example, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police Act states:
s.18. It is the duty of members of the force who are peace
officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner,
(a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers
in relation to the preservation of the peace, the prevention
of crime, and of offences against the laws of Canada and
the laws in force in any province in which they may be
employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders
34
who may be lawfully taken into custody.
In Ontario, the Police Act provides in s.57 that:
s.57. The members of police forces appointed under Part
II, except assistants and civilian employees, are charged with
the duty of preserving the peace, preventing robberies and
other crimes and offences, including offences against the bylaws of the municipality, and apprehending offenders, and
commencing proceedings before the proper tribunal, and
prosecuting and aiding in the prosecuting of offenders, and
have generally all the powers and privileges and are liable
to all the duties and responsibilities that belong to
35
constables.
As can be seen, the current legal position of the police is defined
in terms which refer to the traditional common law offices of

34. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-9, s. 18.
35. Ontario Police Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 381, s. 57.
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constable and peace officer. It is therefore necessary to consider
briefly the evolution of those offices in England and Canada.
(a). The common law offices
Traditionally, the duties of the police were the duties of every
member of the community. Medieval society was structured
on a system of "universal interguardianship" 36 in which the
community as a whole was liable for failing to apprehend
robbers, and for providing itself with a "watch and ward"
37
system.
William Lambard, in his book, The Duties of Constables,
Borsholder, Tithingmen, and such other Low Ministers of the
Peace, 1583, listed a number of powers specifically granted by
common law and statute to prevent, pacify, and punish breaches
of the peace. 38 These included powers of arrest and imprisonment
and it seems clear that in preserving the peace the authority
39
of these local officials was strictly limited.
The medieval system began to break down by the seventeenth
century. Local offices were unpopular, unremunerated and often
abused while the adequacy of the protection provided was
questioned. 40 In 1753 the Bow Street Runners, a small body
of paid, full-time constables was established. The creation of
this force was the first step towards the professionalization of
the police and the trend continued and expanded until 1829

36. Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant
(1936), 49 Harvard Law Review, 566 at 579.
37. These and other traditional practices were enacted in The Statute of
Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. 6 which is perhaps the first attempt to legislate
on community protection. The hierarchy which evolved included constables,
borsholders, tithingmen, headboroughs and sheriffs whose primary purpose
was to conserve the local peace. See Philip Stenning, Legal Status of the
Police. Study Paper prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
July, 1981 at 13.
38. William Lambard, The Duties of Constables, Borsholder, Tithingmen
and such other Low Ministers of the Peace, 1583 as cited in Stenning, Id.,
at 11-12.
39. See generally, Stenning, Id. at 29-31. See also T.A. Critchley, History
of the Police in England and Wales 900-1966 (Revised Edition London:
Constable, 1978); W.L. Lee, A History of the Police in England, 1901 Reprint,
(Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson, Smith, 1971); L. Radzinowicz, A History
of English Criminal Law, Vol. III: The Reform of the Police (London: Stevens
and Sons Ltd., 1956).
40. Hall, see, supra note 36 at 580-81.
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when Sir Robert Peel established the Metropolitan Police
Force. 4 ' Although Peel recognized that the responsibility of its
agents was essential to an efficient police force, 42 the reforms
which he initiated were met with strong and vocal opposition.
Champions of individual liberty saw the proposed establishment
of a police force as an attempt to strengthen executive powers
and particular care was taken "that the constables of the police
43
do not form false notions of their duties and powers".
In his study prepared for the Law Reform Commission of
Canada on the legal status of the police, Stenning writes:
It seems clear that despite the degeneration in prestige and
efficiency of the office-holders during the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, . . . the essential legal authority and status
of the constable, which had been established by the sixteenth
century, did not significantly change during the ensuing three
centuries. We can also be reasonably certain . . . that it was
this office that was introduced into Canada in the eighteenth
century, and for which provision was made in the Parish
and Town Officers Act of 1793 (S.U.C. 1793, 33 Geo. III,
c. 2).

44

The development of the modern police in Canada is primarily
one of statutory evolution and expansion. For the purposes
of this analysis it is sufficient to note that the roots of the
contemporary office of constable are found in medieval England
and that the tradition of the common law constable is one of
45
strictly limited authority.
(b). The duties of the police
The primary function of the constable is the preservation of
the peace - a function which is expressed in a number of
more specific duties.
The first duty of a constable is always to prevent the
commission of a crime. If a constable reasonably apprehends
that the action of any person may result in a breach of the

41. Id. at 583.
42. 21 Hansard Parl. Deb. (N.S.) 872 cited in Hall, Id. at 584.
43. Lee, see, supra note 39 at 241.
44. Stenning, see, supra note 37 at 33.
45. For an interesting discussion of the historical development of the office
of constable at common law see R. v. Walker (1980), 48 C.C.C. (2d) 126
at 137 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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peace it is his duty to prevent that action. It is his general
duty to protect life and property. The general function
of
46
controlling traffic on the roads is derived from this duty.
These common law duties have been recognized within the
various policing statutes. However the policeman acting in
pursuance of duty is not by reason thereof given immunity from
the law. Police power is neither more nor less than that of
the average citizen in the absence of unambiguous authority
at statute or common law. 47 In other words, the police may
"break the law", i.e. infringe on rights of liberty or property
only when specifically empowered to do so. 48 The fact that a
duty exists to, for example, prevent crime, in no way implies
that all authority necessary to effectively prevent crime also
exists. This belief in the 'Rule of Law' is exemplified in the
writings of the great constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey.
Every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject
to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. . . with us every official,
from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector
of taxes, is under the responsibility for every act done without
legal justification as any other citizen. The Reports abound
with cases in which officials have been brought before the
courts, and made, in their personal capacity, liable to
punishment, or to the payment of damages, for acts done
in their official character but in excess of their lawful
authority. A colonial governor, a secretary of state, a military
officer, and all subordinates though carrying out the
commands of their official superiors, are as responsible for
any act which the law49 does not authorise as is any private
and unofficial person.
As a society, we recognize the importance of controlled and
accountable power. In the words of Dicey: "the 'rule of law'

46. Peter Harvey, "Police", Vol. 36, Halsburv's Laws of England (4th ed.
London: Butterworths, 1981), para. 320, p. 200. See also Great Britain: Royal
Commission on the Police, Final Report, Cmnd 1728 (1962) at 22.
47. See McLurg v. Brenton (1904), 98 N.W. 881 at 882; R. v. Ella Paint
(1917), 28 C.C.C. 171 at 174 (N.S.S.C.); Re McAvoy (1970), 12 C.R.N.S.
56 at 60 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.); R. v. Richardson (1924), 42 C.C.C. 95 at 96
(Sask. K.B.); and in England, Christie and Another v. Leachinsky, [1947]
A.C. 573 at 591, 602 (H.L.).
48. R. v. Ella Paint, Id. at 175.
49. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
(10th ed. London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1959) at 193-94.

The Law of Police Authority 699

in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials
or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs
50
other citizens. "
Clearly the distinction between police duty and police authority is a fundamental one. Canadian policing statutes speak in
terms of duty. The powers granted by s.57 of the Ontario Police
Act are referrable to the powers held by a common law constable.
Similarly, the Alberta Police Act, in s.31, states:
s.31(l). Every member of a police force has the power and
it is his duty to
(a)
perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers
in relation to
51
(i) the preservation of peace.
The power-creating aspects of this section are minimal and are
related to the power of a peace officer at common law which
was, as we have seen, strictly limited. It is a mistake to construe
federal and provincial policing legislation as anything other than
a general statutory scheme for the administration and
composition of an effective police force.
This approach to the various Police Acts is in accord with
generally accepted principles of statutory interpretation 52 and
53
the vast majority of both Canadian and English case law.
It is presumed that the legislature does not intend to alter the
common law or to abridge existing common law rights unless

50. Id. at 202-03. In Christie and Another v. Leachinsky, supra note 47,
Lord du Parcq noted at 602 "the reluctance of the courts to accord to the
officer of the law any rights or privileges which are denied to private citizens".
51. Alberta Police Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. p-12, s. 31.
52. See re general rule of strict interpretation: Bowditch v. Balchin (1850),
5 Exch. 378; A.G. for Can. v. Hallett and Carey Ltd., [1952] A.C. 427 at
450-51 (P.C.); Que. Railwayv, Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Vaudr', [1920]
A.C. 662 at 679-80 (P.C.).
53. See particularly Cliaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834, 114 C.C.C. 170,
I D.L.R. (2d) 241 and R. v. Custer, Sask. C.A., as yet unreported, where
the Court of Appeal at 6 did not disturb the finding at the first appeal level
that "there is no statutory provision in The Police Act [R.S.S. 1978, c. p15, particularly section 37 (3) (a)] which can justify unlawful interference
with the liberty or property of the accused so as to justify the unlawful entry
by the police".
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such intention is clearly and specifically stated.54 The 1980 House
of Lords decision in Morris v. Beardsmore55 is unequivocal
on this point. The case deals with the English Road Traffic
Act 56 and a charge of failure to provide a breath specimen which
was demanded by constables who were trespassers in the
accused's home. Although there are issues which are specific
to the English legislation, the case nevertheless stands as a ringing
declaration of the need for specific statutory authority to infringe
common law rights. In the words of Lord Diplock:
If Parliament intends to authorize the doing of an act which
would constitute a tort actionable at the suit of the person
57
to whom the act is done, this requires provision in the statute.
The court was unwilling to imply any greater authority than
that specifically created by the statute. Lord Scarman states:
It is not the task of judges, exercising their ingenuity in the
field of implication, to go further in the invasion of
fundamental private rights and liberties than Parliament has
expressly authorized. The importance of express provision
is that it affords the citizen the opportunity, if he chooses
to use it, to read and understand the58extent to which his
rights and liberties have been curtailed.
59
The Canadian Supreme Court in Colet v. The Queen
unanimously agreed that:
... any statutory provision authorizing police officers to
invade the property of others without invitation or permission
would be an encroachment on the common law rights of
the property owner, and in case of any ambiguity would be
subject to a strict construction
in favour of the common law
60
rights of the owner.
54. See P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th
ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1969) at 116. See also S.G.G. Edgar, Craies
on Statute Law (7th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1971) at 121-22 and
E.A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1957) at 127.
55. [1980] 2 All E.R. 753, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 283 (H.L.).
56. English Road Traffic Act 1972 (c. 20), s. 8(2) (5).
57. See, supra note 55 at 757.
58. Id. at 763. This approach is reiterated by Lord Keith in Finnigan v.
Sandiford, [1981] 2 All E.R. 267 at 271 (H.L.); "Parliament cannot be taken
to have authorized any further inroads on the rights of individual citizens
than it specifically enacted".
59. (1981), 19 C.R. (3d) 84 (S.C.C.).
60. Id. at 92.
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Rules of statutory interpretation require that the judiciary err
in favour of individual liberty rather than by empowering an
official of the state with any additional authority, 6' and this
principle has been repeatedly recognized by the courts.
The Colet decision and its implications have recently been
reviewed by the Supreme Court in the companion cases of R.
v. Lyons 62 and the Interception of Private Communications
Reference.63 Both cases involve the Invasion of Privacy
provisions of the Criminal Code and in particular whether or
not the specifically created authority to intercept private
communications creates by necessary implication the authority
to trespass when necessary to implant a listening device, R.
v. Lyons deals with the admissibility of evidence obtained by
means of an unauthorized entry while the Reference case simply
asks the court to answer two questions: 1) Does an authorization
given under Part IV. 1 by necessary implication authorize entry
for the purpose of interception? 2) Does ajudge have jurisdiction
to expressly authorize an entry for the purpose of interception?
In both cases the court split 4:2 in favour of recognizing an
64
implied authority to enter.
The majority decision, enunciated in R. v. Lyons and adopted
in the Reference case is based on a narrow point of statutory
construction. Mr. Justice Estey, with whom Beetz, McIntyre
and Lamer J.J.'s concurred, decided that the process of
"interception" authorized by the legislation is a single
undertaking which, depending on the type of device chosen,
may require a surreptitious entry. In his opinion the authority
to trespass arises by "necessary implication and unavoidable
inference" 65 from the statute. According to Estey, J.Parliament
61. See P. St. J. Langan, supra note 54 at 251-52. See also R. v. Ella Paint,
supra note 47 at 175; R. v. Richardson (1924), 18 Sask. L.R. 209, [1924]
I W.W.R. 920, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1001 (Sask. K.B.); R. v. Jaagusta, [1974]
3 W.W.R. 766 at 768 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Erikson (1978), 39 C.C.C. (2d)
447 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); Finnigan v. Sandiford, supra note 58; R. v. Rao (1984),

46 O.R. (2d) 30 at 90 (Ont. C.A.).
62. R. v. Lyons, supra note 30.
63. Interception Reference, supra note 30.
64. The issue has provoked a wealth of academic comment and analysis.
See, for example Stanley M. Beck, Electronic Surveillance in the
Administration of Criminal Justice (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 643, Stanley
Cohen, Invasion of Privacy, 1983, and David Watt, The Law of Electronic
Surveillance in Canada, 1979.

65. R. v. Lyons, supra note 30 at 22.
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must have realized that covert entry to install and remove certain
types of devices was necessary. Therefore in granting authority
to intercept with these devices the legislature was necessarily
granting authority to enter. He writes:
Explicitness is a requirement before legislation may properly
be found to be intrusive of these basic rights [privacy and
property]. However, the need to express the obvious is66 not
present in any of the canons of statutory interpretation.
Mr. Justice Estey is careful to note that these implied powers
must be exercised with great caution and only in circumstances
67
where necessity is clearly demonstrated.
The minority judgment of Chief Justice Dickson, with whom
Chouinard, J. concurred is based on a strict approach to
construction and an obvious concern with the implications of
creating an implied authority to act illegally. Dickson, C.J.C.
rejects the argument that the power is necessary to implement
the legislation as an "appeal to convenience'68 and notes that
the omission of an authority to enter in the context of an
extremely specific and detailed section suggests that the creation
of such authority was not intended. He distinguishes between
physical and conversational privacy and concludes:
I am not prepared to infer that Parliament, by authorizing
invasion of privacy in one form, has thereby authorized
invasion of privacy in another form . . . In my view, the
decision in Colet v. R., and the classic principle of statutory
interpretation it embodies, are in the end dispositive of this
case ... Ultimately, the logic upon which Colet turns is the
traditional legal protection accorded private property and
the long-standing refusal of the judiciary to impair that
protection where Parliament has not itself done so
69
expressly.
A careful reading of the reasons of the majority in these
two cases suggests that the decision is fact-specific and should
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 23. Unfortunately, Estey, J. is unwilling to do more than suggest
that judges in issuing authorizations, clearly specify what the interception
process will entail, He cites s. 178.13(2)(d) which requires the authorizing
judge to include in the authorization "such terms and conditions as the judge
considers advisable in the public interest" as evidence of the judicial safeguard
function envisaged by the legislature.
68. Interception Reference, supra note 30 at 51
69. Id. at 53, 58.
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not be extended to augment police power. It is easy to
understand Estey, J.'s concern with the efficacy of the
legislation and the unavoidable necessity, in his view, of
recognizing a limited authority to trespass. The authority
created by Parliament to "intercept" is a specific indication that
common law rights are to be encroached, and in the opinion
of the majority the authority to "intercept" is specific enough
to authorize trespass. However, in my opinion the minority
judgment is more convincing. Chief Justice Dickson's insistence
on the need for explicit authority to enter without consent is
consistent with traditions of statutory interpretation long
recognized at common law. It is also important to note that
these cases deal with specific authority - granting provisions
in the Criminal Code and not merely with a statement of general
duty such as exists in policing statutes.
The case of Chaput v. Romain70 is a 1955 Supreme Court
decision in which the court considered an action against three
officers of the Provincial Police Force who interrupted and
dispersed a meeting of the Jehovah's Witness without lawful
authority. The court's reasoning turns primarily on whether
the officers had a defence to their unlawful acts based either
on superior orders or The Magistrate's Privilege Act. 7 1 The
unanimous nine member court held that the Provincial Police
Force Act 72 had no bearing on the action and afforded no
protection to the officers in question. In discussing the
applicability of the Police Act, albeit in obiter, Taschereau,
J., with whom Kerwin and Estey, J.J.'s concurred stated:
The Act respecting the Provincial Police Force has no
application. It determines the duties and functions of the
Force, the services that it must render, the direction that
it must follow, its composition as well as the conditions of
admission and the regulations that may be adopted. It
contains no provision, the effect of which would be to
exculpate a public officer who commits a delict or quasi-

70. See, supra note 53.
71. R.S.Q. 1941, c. 18.
72. R.S.Q. 1941, c. 47.
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delict, whether or not he is acting in the performance of
73
his duties.
Clearly, statutes such as the Criminal Code which authorize
police officers to arrest without warrant or authorize search
with warrant are specifically intended to abridge common law
rights. Parliament has turned its collective mind to the
desirability of such infringements and decided to authorize
them. Statutes such as the Ontario Police Act or the RCMP
Act can in no way be seen to create similar authority. Rather,
they are employment statutes whose terms establish the
administrative make-up, composition and rules and regulations
governing the forces which they create. 74 The duty-imposing
sections are simply statutory expressions which define police
functions with respect to the community they serve and the
government which employs them. To suggest that these sections
may imply and create authority to act contrary to law
contradicts recognized principles of interpretation and is
inconsistent with the legislative intent that is evident on any
75
examination of the statute as a whole.
In summary then, both the Supreme Court of Canada and
the House of Lords, in accordance with traditionally accepted
canons of interpretation have refused to encroach on common
law or statutory rights in the absence of express statutory
language. Although the recently decided Interception Reference
suggests that opinions may differ on what is implied by specific
language the court nevertheless maintains its allegiance to the
rule of construction in favour of vested rights. Even in the
context of authority-granting statutes such as the Criminal
Code or the English Road Traffic Act the courts are reluctant
to imply any additional powers. To suggest that statutes which
73. See, supra note 53 at 174. Similarly, in Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R.
321, Rand, J. concluded that the unlawful actions of police officers could
not be said to be "in their official capacity" or "in the performance of public
duty" at 342. As a result a procedural defence to actions for malicious
prosecution and unlawful arrest was unavailable.
74. See, for example, the Ontario Police Act, Part 1, Division of Responsibility;
Part 11, s. 8, Creation, Composition, Remuneration of Boards, s. 28-40,
Bargaining and Arbitration; The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, Part
I, Constitution and Organization; Part I11, Discipline.
75. The duty-imposing section of the RCMP Act is but one section of twentyone in the Part dealing with Constitution and Organization. These other

sections deal with such areas as the Commissioner, the Civilian Staff,
Headquarters, Tenure of Office of Members, and Pay and Allowances.
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merely impose and enunciate employment duties may be
construed so as to authorize infringements of common law
rights is to reject both the stated position of the courts and
the accepted principles of statutory interpretation.
3. The Case Law on PoliceAuthority
In Canada today, the majority of federal authority-granting
provisions are to be found in the Criminal Code. However,
underlying the specific statutory enactments is a long tradition
of common law which severely restricts police power to infringe
on protected rights. The vast majority of the case law in this
area involves criminal charges such as assault or obstruction
of a police officer in the execution of duty. The fact that the
offences are described in terms of "execution of duty" may well
explain the frequent confusion between the concepts of duty
and authority. Most judgments however, recognize the
fundamental principle that a police officer who is in breach
of the law, either civil or criminal, is not in the execution of
76
his duty.
Any discussion of the law in this area must begin with a
consideration of one of the great common law cases, the mideighteenth century decision in Entick v. Carrington.77 The issue
in that decision was the legality of a warrant issued by the
Secretary of State which purported to create authority to seize
and apprehend the plaintiff as well as his books and papers.
The reasoning of Lord Camden is justly famous as an assertion
of the recognized common law principle that:
76. See Halsburv ' Laws of England, 4th ed., supra note 46. Among the
many judgments which recognize this principle are: R. v. Walker (1854), 169
E.R. 759 (C.C.); Broughton v. Wilkerson (1880), 44 J.P. 781; R. v. Doyle
(1920), 35 C.C.C., 6 (Sask. C.A.); Johanson v. The King, Daniluk v. The
King (1947), 89 C.C.C. 305, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 337 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ryan (1956),
18 W.W.R. 684 (B.C.C.A.); Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414; R. v.
Middleton et al., [1969] 1 O.R. 275, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 197 (Ont. C.A.); Tunbridge
v. The Queen, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 77 (B.C.C.A.); Sandison v. Rybiak (1974),
I O.R. (2d) 74 (Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. MacLeod(1979), 61 A.P.R. 479 (P.E.I.S.C.);
Lindlev v. Rutter, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 660 (Q.B.); R. v. Prince(1981), 61 C.C.C.
(2d) 73 (Man. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Oake (1981), 61 C.C.C.. (2d) 129 (N.S. Co.
Ct.); R. v. Landry, [1981] 63 C.C.C. (2d) 290 (Ont. C.A.); McLorie v. Oxford,
[1982] 3 W.L.R. 423 (Q.B.); Bentley v. Brudzinski, [1982] Crim. L.R. 825;
R. v. Lis (1984), 48 A.R. 157 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Wood(1984), 52 A.R.
356 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Custer, supra note 50.
77. (1765), 19 State Tr. 1029, 95 E.R. 807 (K.B.).
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.. . our law holds the property of every man so sacred, that
no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without
his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no
damage at all; if he will 78tread upon his neighbour's ground,
he must justify it by law.
The need for a rule of positive law to authorize illegal official
acts was asserted even earlier in the case of The Queen v.
Toolev, decided in 1709. 79 The case involved a conviction of
either murder or manslaughter, the seriousness of the verdict
being dependent on whether or not the victim, who was a police
officer, was acting in the execution of duty. The court stated:
The prisoners in this case had sufficient provocation; for if
one be imprisoned upon unlawful authority, it is a sufficient
provocation to all people out of compassion; much more
where it is done under a colour of justice, and where the
liberty of the subject is invaded, it is a provocation to all
if anyone against the law
the subjects of England ...
imprisons a man he is an offender against Magna Charta. 80
Clearly, over three hundred years ago the common law required
that invasive official acts be justified by lawful authority.
Similarly, in the 1864 case of R. v. Lockley8" the court
considered whether the accused should be found guilty of
murder or manslaughter when in resisting arrest they caused
the death of an officer. The court concluded that in resisting
an unlawful arrest the accused were justified in using necessary
force, and that only the use of unnecessary violence causing
death would result in a conviction of manslaughter. In the
course of his reasons Shee, J. wrote: "It is sufficient, however,
if the constable was on duty in uniform within his proper
district . . . but then this does not raise any presumption that
the acts done by him were done lawfully and in the proper
execution of duty".82
This attitude was adopted in Ontario as well. In an 1895
case involving an alleged illegal arrest and the statutory
protection afforded to the officer involved Boyd, C. stated:
a constable acting colore officii was not protected by
...
the statute . . . where the act committed is of such a nature
78. Id. at 817.
79. (1709), 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 E.R. 349.

80. Id. at 352-53.
81. R. v. Lockley.,
82. Id. at 512.

[1864] 4 F. and F. 155, 176 E.R. 511 (Crown Ct.).
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that the office gives him no authority to do it: in
the doing
83
of that act he is not to be considered as an officer.
Four years later, Rose, J. reiterated this approach in discussing
a case involving an unauthorized and unjustified handcuffing.
. . . while the Courts have always protected its officers in

the discharge of duty, they never have nor indeed can84they
brook injustice being committed in the name of the law.
The twentieth century has seen this principle asserted time and
time again. Although the existence of various empowering
statutes has often complicated the reasoning, the essential
concept has remained basically unaltered. A constable who is
acting unlawfully, in arresting, in failing to comply with
statutory provisions, or in entering or searching without
85
warrant or authority is not in the execution of his duty.
The 1936 King's Bench decision in Davis v. Lisle86 is perhaps
typical of this approach. In that case, a police officer entered
the appellant's garage without permission and without a
warrant, in order to make inquiries regarding an alleged
offence. The appellant directed the police officer to leave and
when he refused to do so, assaulted him. The court held that
a charge of assault in the execution of duty could not stand
since once he was asked to leave the police officer became a
trespasser and was not thereafter in the execution of duty. In
the course of its reasons the court cited an earlier King's Bench
decision, Great Central Railway Company v. Bates87 which
stated:
.. . the case has been put on the analogy of a person having
a right as a matter of public duty to enter into premises
... It appears to be very important that it should be

83. Kelly v. Barton; Kelly v. Archibald (1895), 26 O.R. 608 at 622 (Chanc.
Div.).
84. Hamilton v. Massie (1880), 18 O.R. 585 at 589 (C.P. Div.).
85. See Halsburv's Laws of England, 4th ed., supra note 46. See generally
the cases cited in note 76. In McLorie v. Oxford, supra note 76, Donald,
L.J. stated for the court: "'In the execution of his duty' is not the same
as 'on duty'. The essence of the offence is that the police constable is assaulted
whilst he is acting within the limits of his lawful authority" at 426.
86. [1936] 2 K.B. 434. This case was specifically adopted by the New Zealand
Supreme Court in Matthews v. Dwan, [1949] N.Z.L.R. 1037 and in R. v.
Ryan, supra note 76.

87. [1921] 3 K.B. 578.
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enter premises except
established that nobody has a right to
88
strictly in accordance with authority.
One of the most significant modern authorities on the law
of police power is the 1964 English Court of Appeal decision
in R. v. Waterfield.'" The decision is often cited, primarily
because of the test enunciated by Ashworth, J. in the course
of his reasons.
In the judgment of this court it would be difficult, and in
the present case it is unnecessary, to reduce within specific
limits the general terms in which the duties of police constables
have been expressed. In most cases it is probably more
convenient to consider what the police constable was actually
doing and in particular whether such conduct was prima facie
an unlawful interference with a person's liberty or property.
If so, it is then relevant to consider whether (a) such conduct
falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute
or recognized at common law and (b) whether such conduct,
albeit within the general scope of such duty, involved an
unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty. 90
The test is often used as a vehicle for determining the lawfulness
of a particular police action. However, it is submitted that the
test is often misinterpreted both on its own and in the context
of the case. In addition, although the case provided some
welcome clarity, Waterfield is not a culminating statement on
the law of police duty and authority, but rather only one of
many decisions in a large body of relevant case law.
The facts of the case are straightforward. The defendants,
Lyn and Waterfield attempted to remove a car which was being
watched by two police constables. The constables suspected that
the car had been involved in a serious offence and, without
charging or arresting the defendants, sought to prevent the car
from being removed. The defendants were charged with
assaulting a peace officer in the execution of duty when, in
the course of removing the vehicle, one constable was threatened
and one touched by the moving car. The issue for the court
was whether or not the constables could be said to be acting
in the execution of duty. The Crown contended that the
constables were attempting to preserve for use in court evidence
88. Id. at 582.
89. See, supra note 25.
90. Id. at 170-71.
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of a crime and that in pursuance of that duty they were entitled
to detain the car without charge or arrest.
In the course of its reasons, the court enunciated the test
set out above. The result, however, was an acquittal. While
the Court recognized the existence of a duty to preserve evidence
for use in court, the existence of that duty did not imply the
authority to prevent the removal of the car. In fact, the court
clearly recognizes that there is no authority, either at common
law or by statute which, in the absence of an arrest or charge,
empowered the constables to detain the car. In other words,
the duty did not imply the authority to seize property and the
court was unable to find any specific authority which in fact
granted to the constables the power they purported to exercise.
The constables were infringing on the respondents' property
rights without specific authority and were therefore not acting
in the execution of duty. The case is a strong judicial statement
of the distinction between duty and authority since, even though
the police officers were acting within the scope of their duty,
they lacked the requisite authority to breach common law rights.
When considered in light of the actual result in the case the
test as enunciated takes on added significance. Conduct by a
police officer which infringes on common law rights of liberty
or property is prima facie unlawful. The test goes on to say
that in order to be lawful the conduct must be within the general
scope of duty and in addition must involve a justifiable use
of powers associated with duty. Clearly then, in order to apply
the test the crucial question is; what powers are associated with
duty? What authority has been granted to the police in the
context of performing a general duty? Powers which infringe
on recognized rights must be specifically enunciated either at
common law or by statute. Chief Justice Dickson, in his
dissenting reasons in the Interception Reference states:
The fact that police officers could be described as acting within
the general scope of their duties to investigate crime cannot
empower them to violate the law whenever such conduct could
be justified by the public interest in law enforcement. Any
such principle would be nothing short of a fiat for illegality
on the part of the police whenever the benefit of police action
appeared to outweigh the infringement of an individual's
rights. For the Waterfield principle to apply, the police must
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be engaged in lawful execution of their duty at the time of
the conduct in question. 9'
In Waterfield the authority to detain the car did not exist. In
Canada the authority to break-in, unlawfully seize papers or
92
burn barns is similarly non-existent.
In Johnson v. Phillips93 the Queen's Bench Division clearly
recognized the important distinction between duty and power.
In that case the court decided that a police officer in performing
his duty to control traffic on public roads had the power at
common law to compel disobedience to a traffic regulation (in
this situation a one-way street). That authority, however, was
strictly limited to situations in which a virtual emergency had
arisen and it was reasonably necessary for the protection of
life and property. 94 It is important to note that the court does
not suggest that the duty to control traffic implies a general
authority to break the law whenever it appears expedient.
We stress that we do not decide that a constable has powers,
traffic to reverse the
whenever he thinks it right, to order
95
wrong way along a one-way street.
The court in Johnson v. Phillips cites as authority the 1974
case of Hoffran v. Thomas. 96 This is another excellent example
of the crucial distinction between duty and authority which
is at the heart of the common law. The case involved a motorist
who refused to take part in a census when requested to do
so by the respondent police officer. The court found that the
constable had a duty to direct traffic and a power to regulate
91. See, supra note 30 at 56. The majority did not discuss the Waterfield
principle.
92. This approach to Waterfield has been adopted clearly in a number of
cases. For example in R. v. Custer, supra note 53 at 16-26 Chief Justice
Bayda adopts a 4 stage approach: I) What was the police officer actually
doing?; 2) Was it primafacie an unlawful interference? 3) Was it within the
general scope of duty? and 4) Did it involve an unjustifiable use of powers
associated with duty? The Chief Justice determined that the police officer's
unauthorized and forcible entry into the respondent's home was within the
general scope of a common law duty to investigate a stabbing and apprehend
an offender. However there was no power at common law or statute which
entitled the officer to enter the house against the housholder's will. Therefore
the constable was acting outside his lawful authority and was not engaged
in the execution of duty. See also Rice v. Connolly, supra note 76, and R.
v. Dedman (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 97 at 109-111 (O.C.A.).
93. [1975] 3 All E.R. 682 (Q.B.).

94. Id. at 686.
95. Id.
96. [1974] 2 All E.R. 233 (Q.B.).
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traffic because "of the danger to life and limb which unregulated
traffic can present". 97 However, this limited authority to regulate
did not include the authority to compel participation in a census.
The court stated:
When the police officer made his signal directing the appellant
to leave the motorway and go into the census area, he made
a signal which he had no power to make either at common
law or by virtue of statute, and consequently ...the giving

of that signal
cannot have been an act in the execution of
98
his duty.

While the majority of Canadian cases adopt the interpretation
of Waterfield previously submitted, 99 two Supreme Court
decisions appear to suggest that police duty may indeed create
limited authority to break the law. 00 Both have rightly been
the subject of academic comment and criticism,' 0' given very
limited application by the courts, and it is suggested that neither
case provides an authoritative statement of general principle.
R. v. Stenning0 2 is an exceptionally unfortunate judgment
which on its face appears to say that a trespass does not remove
an officer from the execution of his duty. The facts of the case
are admirably summarized in the following extract.
Constables arriving at business premises in the evening found
a man outside beaten and bleeding. It was also discovered
that a firearm had been discharged. A constable saw someone
moving in the building. The police, unable to induce those
within to open the building, entered through a window to
search the premises. There two persons were found, who had
been drinking heavily. A constable shook one to awake03him
in order to ask questions and was thereupon assaulted.
97. Id. at 238.
98. Id.
99. See, for example: R. v. Middleton et al., Tunbridge v. The Queen, Sandison
v. Rybiak, R. v. MacLeod, R. v. Prince, R. v. Oake, R. v. Landry, R. v.
Lis, R. v. Wood, supra note 76; R. v. Dedman, supra note 92; R. v. Custer,
supra note 53; and R. ex rel Crewson v. Alexandre, (1974) 4 W.W.R. 315
(Alta. Dist. Ct.).
100. R. v. Stenning, [1970] 10 D.L.R. (3d) 224 (S.C.C.); Knowlton v. The
Queen, [1973] 10 C.C.C. (2d) 377 (S.C.C.). See also L.H. Leigh, Police Powers
in England and Wales (London: Butterworths, 1975) at 33.
101. See, for example, A Grant, The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Police (1978), 20 Crim. L.Q. 152 which comments on four significant decisions
in the area of police authority including Knowlton and Stenning.
102. R. v. Stenning, supra note 100.
103. L.H. Leigh, supra note 100 at 32.
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In a two and a half page judgment, half of which is devoted
to a recitation of the facts, the Supreme Court simply states
that the officers were acting in the course of their duties under
the Police Act even though they were technically trespassers.
The decision, which is remarkable both for its brevity and
paucity of reasoning, cites no Canadian authority and refers
only briefly to the test enunciated in Waterfield. The court
appears to rely on the fact that the respondent was not, in
fact, the owner or occupier of the building and that the trespass
therefore was not an interference with his rights of property.
According to the court, at the time of the assault neither the
liberty nor property rights of the respondent had been infringed
and the officers were in the execution of their duty at least
with respect to the respondent.
Even on this limited ground the judgment is unsatisfactory.
The duty identified was a broad and general one to investigate
occurences. It is clear that in performing this duty the constables
were operating outside the strict letter of the law and were,
in fact at the very least, committing civil trespass. While the
respondent was almost certainly guilty of assault, by convicting
him on the more serious charge of assault in the execution
of duty, the court appears to have significantly expanded the
concept of duty. While one can sympathize with the court's
dislike of the violent and uncalled for conduct of the respondent,
it is submitted that a significant expansion of the law of police
powers is an inappropriate response. Because of its understandable reluctancce to excuse the respondent simply because the
charge was improperly laid, the court has fashioned a clearly
result-oriented decision. According to Stenning, "technical"
illegality committed during the course of investigation does not
render an officer outside the execution of duty. Since it is difficult
to conceive of a situation in which an officer is not arguably
investigating an occurence, potential liability for charges such
as assault or obstruction in the execution of duty has been
significantly expanded. Differentiating between merely technical
as opposed to substantial police illegality is a cumbersome and
unsatisfactory method of protecting the individual citizen from
the overzealous officer. It is submitted that the case should
be construed narrowly, and should be viewed as both a factual
aberration and an unfortunately result-oriented decision, rather
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than as a statement of general principle. 04 The decision stands
in fundamental contradiction with not only Waterfield, the only
case to which it refers, but also with the established traditions
of the common law.
In Knowlton v. The Queen) 5 the Supreme Court was again
faced with an obstreporous individual whose conviction for
obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty was
confirmed. The facts in the case were that the police, as part
of security arrangements made in anticipation of a visit by the
Soviet Premier, cordoned off a small area in downtown
Edmonton. The police had no specific authority to block off
the area in question or to prevent citizens from entering. The
accused, a press photographer, forcefully insisted on his right
to enter the restricted area and as a result was arrested on
a charge of obstruction. At trial the accused was acquitted the judge finding that the police, who were not enforcing any
Criminal Code provisions or any by-laws were not in the
execution of duty. This result was reversed on appeal.
The Supreme Court drew particular attention to the fact that
the police were attempting to prevent an assault on Premier
Kosygin such as had occurred earlier in the visit. The court
purported to apply the Waterfield test and found that the police
had a "specific and binding obligation to take proper and
reasonable steps" 0 6 to prevent a renewed criminal assault on
the visiting dignitary. Like Stenning, the decision in Knowlton
is remarkably brief -- four pages of which two are devoted
to legal analysis. No Canadian authority is cited for the result
and indeed it is difficult to extract a coherent legal justification
for the decision. Chief Justice Fauteaux refers obliquely to the

104. In R. v. Custer, supra note 53 at I I the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
struggled to distinguish Stenning and stated its ratio in the following lengthy
and rather convoluted sentence: "If a police officer, in the course of making

an investigation of a serious crime, finds himself on private property without
license or leave from the owner (but not in defiance of an express objection
by the owner or occupier), he is not acting ipso Jacto outside the limits of
his authority in continuing the investigation; and the police officer's "technical
trespass" is no defence to a stranger to the property who is charged with
assaulting the police officer engaged in the execution of his duty if prior
to assault the police officer was not asked to leave and did not interfere
with the stranger's person or property".
105. Knowlton v. The Queen, supra note 100.
106. Id. at 380.
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principles underlying section 30 of the Criminal Code, 107 and
suggests that the restriction of access to public streets was a
reasonable and not unusual step in the circumstances. He also
comments on the likelihood that the appellant was aware of
the security situation which existed and on the fact that he
was carrying an inadequate press identification card. While these
facts may reduce any tenuous sympathy one has for the
appellant's stubborn behaviour their legal relevance is marginal
and is in fact not clarified by the court. In the Waterfield case
to which the court refers, the accused were acquitted because
there was no clear authority for the police officers to detain
the car. Mr. Knowlton, on the other hand, was convicted based
only on the authority of Waterfield and despite the fact that
the court appears unable or unwilling to identify any specific
authority for the police officer's actions.
It is respectfully submitted that this decision is wrong. The
court was unable to identify any common law or statutory power
to interfere with the appellant's freedom of access to public
streets. The police therefore had a right to ask the appellant
to respect the cordoned-off area, but had no power to compel
his obedience. It is of course unfortunate that Mr. Knowlton
insisted so vigorously on his rights and refused to co-operate
with an eminently reasonable police precaution. However, the
fact that a small minority of citizens will refuse to co-operate
in like situations does not justify the rejection of fundamental
principles.
Recently, in Colet v. The Queen'0 8 the Supreme Court appears
to have recanted somewhat from its position in Knowlton and
Stenning. The accused had been charged with a number of
criminal offences arising out of his defence of his property.
The police claimed the authority of a warrant to seize issued
under the former s. 105(1) of the Criminal Code to justify their
attempted entry on the accused's property. Ritchie, J. for the
court wrote:

107. Section 30 of the Criminal Code reads: Everyone who witnesses a breach
of the peace is justified in interfering to prevent the continuance or renewal
thereof and may detain any person who commits or is about to join in or
to renew the breach of the peace for the purpose of giving him into the
custody of a peace officer.

108. [1981] 19 C.R. 84 (S.C.C.).
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This appeal raises the all-important question of whether the
property rights of the individual can be invaded otherwise
than with specific statutory authority. It is true that the
appellant's place of residence was nothing more than a shack
... but what is involved here is the longstanding right of
a citizen of this country to the control and enjoyment of
his own property, including the right to determine who shall
and who shall not be permitted to invade ...
[It] would,
in my view, be dangerous indeed to hold that the private
rights of the individual to the exclusive enjoyment of his
own property are to be subject to invasion by police officers
whenever they can be said to be acting in the furtherance
of the enforcement of any section of the Criminal Code
although they are not armed with express authority to justify
their action. 109
The court is unequivocal in its recognition of the need for specific
authority to infringe common law rights and, as such Colet
is more clearly a statement of principle than either Stenning
or Knowlton.' 10
The 1980 House of Lords decision in Morris v. Beardsmore"'
previously discussed is equally significant as an example of the
evolution of the principles enunciated in Waterfield. Lord
Edmund-Davies asserts:
... although policemen have been vested by statute with
powers beyond those of other people, they are exercisable
only by virtue of the authority thereby conferred on them
and in the execution of their duty ....
In this regard it
is unthinkable that a policeman may properly be regarded
as acting in the execution of his duty when he is acting
unlawfully, and this regardless of whether his contravention
2
is of the criminal law or simply of the civil law. 1
109. Id. at 90-91.
110. In R. v. L'ons, supra note 30 at 35-36, Mr. Justice Estey attempts
to distinguish Colet. He notes that the Colet decision is based on the distinction
between the authority to search and the authority to seize. This distinction

is well-recognized in the Criminal Code and, in Estey, J.'s opinion is not
applicable to the authority to "intercept." He states: "The operation being
regulated by Parliament in Part IV. I was the interception of conversations,
a separate, distinct and complete transaction" which may include entry. Chief
Justice Dickson, for the minority in the Interception Reference, supra note

30 at 58 bases his decision on the principle enunciated in Colet and expresses
grave doubts as to whether it can in fact be distinguished. See text, infra

at 21.
111. See text infra at 20-21.
112. See, supra note 55 at 759.
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Morris v. Beardsmore is an important decision in the law of
police powers and has been followed in two more recent decisions
in addition to being cited in Halsbury's fourth edition. "1 3 The
Waterfield test does not exist in a vacuum. In order to apply
the test it is necessary to first understand the facts of the case
and how the test was applied. Perhaps more importantly,
Waterfield must be placed in context, as one decision in a long
history of case law dating back to Entick v. Carrington and
continuing to evolve today.
PART III: McLeod/McDonald Revisited
1. Introduction
When analyzing the effectiveness of any scholarly document
it is important to keep in mind the biases, explicit or implicit,
of the author. The McLeod Report is primarily and explicitly
intended as a response to and criticism of the McDonald
Commission. As such, the Report recognizes the legitimacy of
certain invasive police practices. The perception that an
expansion of police powers is necessary to preserve law and
order is at the heart of this approach.11 4 The empirical validity
of this assumption is accepted without question. Surely however,
the implications of expanding police authority to interfere with
recognized common law rights go far beyond a perceived need
to combat crime.
The laws which control the exercise of police power lie at
the heart of a legal system which is involved in balancing the
need for effective law enforcement with the individual's right
to be protected against the arbitrary use of authority. In the
words of a senior British police officer.
The police, like laws, reflect the nature of the society which
they serve. Corrupt societies deserve, and get, corrupt police.
Totalitarian societies acquire omnipotent police. Violent

113. See Finnigan v. Sandiford,supra note 58 and McLorie v. Oxford, supra
note 76 and Halsbury's, supra note 46.
114. For an interesting discussion of the "law and order" approach see Stanley
A. Cohen, Invasion of Privacy: Police and Electronic Surveillance in Canada
(1982), 27 McGill L.J., 619 at 625-29.
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get tolerant
societies get violent police. Tolerant societies
5
police. Wise societies bridle police powers.''
The debate between McLeod and McDonald is not merely an
exercise in legal minutiae or an academic squabble over an
ancient doctrine. It is crucial therefore, when evaluating the
McLeod position to look not only at the thoroughness of the
legal analysis but also at the policy implications of the approach.
2. The Legal Analysis
While the McLeod Report reads well superficially it is
surprisingly difficult to extract a coherent legal thesis. The
Committee stresses concepts such as "the ordinary law", "the
global law" and "the ordinary law of the realm in a global
sense", 1 6 which despite countless readings remained unclear to
this reader.
Although one can perhaps excuse murky reasoning or stated
bias, it is less easy to understand the type of legal scholarship
on which the Report's conclusions are based. The choice of
legal authority is clearly made with a view to validate the
conclusions reached, and not to state the existing law. The
Committee has chosen to ignore all case law decided prior to
1959 and in fact with the exception of 3 cases has limited itself
to post-1970 decisions. Although modern authority is clearly
relevant, pivotal cases such as Entick v. Carrington, Davis v.
Lisle, Great Central Railway Co. v. Bates, R. v. Richardson,
R. v. Ella Paint and Chaput v. Romain are apparently ignored.
In addition, although relying primarily on modern authority
the Report fails to mention the significant Beardsmore House
of Lords decision in Morris v. Beardsmore, and mentions the
Supreme Court decision in Colet only in the context of a few
specific examples of police technique and not in the legal
analysis.
Equally troubling is the use of cases without placing the
decisions and comments extracted therefrom in context. The
7 is used as authority for the
case of Schacht v. O'Rourke"1
proposition that it is:
115. J.C. Alderson, "The Principles and Practices of the British Police" in
The Police We Deserve, Alderson and Stead (eds.) at 39 cited in David G.
Humphrey Abuse of their Powers by the Police (1979), L.S.U.C. Special
Lectures, 570.
116. See, supra note 9 at 9-14.
117. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 53.
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• . . inadvisable to attempt to frame a definition which will

set definite limits to the powers and duties of police officers
. . . It is infinitely better that the courts should decide, as

each case arises whether, having regard to the necessities of
the case and the safeguards required in the public interest,
the police are under a legal duty in the particular
circumstances.' 18

While this statement is indeed contained in the reasons of Mr.
Justice Spence and is undoubtedly correct, the case is one
involving the alleged negligence of a police officer and the
subsequent injury to an innocent third party. As such, the court
was discussing the relationship between the police officer's
statutory duty and a possible duty of care owed in negligence
to the respondent. The case is concerned primarily with the
question of whether or not the officer was negligent or careless,
and the liability of the police officer and/or the Commissioner
of Police. It has nothing whatever to do with the concepts of
authority and duty. Similarly, the authors use the case of
Priestman v. Colangelo and Smythson, Priestman v. Shynall
and Smythson, 119 another negligence action to illustrate their
application of the Waterfield principle. The Report states:
In our view the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada,
in Priestman, held that the ordinary law of the realm relevant
to the civil liability of police officers included20 not only the
general law of negligence but also Waterfield.1
It is difficult to conceive of how the Supreme Court could have
intended this result since Waterfield was actually decided some
five years later. Both of these Supreme Court decisions are
used to buttress the Report's analysis - unfortunately neither
is at all relevant.
Surprisingly, the Committee chooses to adopt Halsbury's
third edition, paragraph 206 as an accurate statement of the
general functions of a constable at common law.' 2' In Halsbury's
4th edition, published in 1981, the corresponding paragraph
has been expanded to include a reference which seems to
specifically refute the underlying thesis of the Report.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 65-66.
[1959] 124 C.C.C. 1, 19 D.L.R. (2d) I (S.C.C.).
See, supra note 9 at 53.
Ibid. at 25.
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However, a constable is himself subject to the law, and he
cannot claim immunity from it by reason only that he is
acting in pursuance of his duty; indeed a constable who flouted
the law (whether civil or criminal) could scarcely be said
to be acting in the execution of his duty as such.122
Possibly, the most recent edition of Halsbury was not available
to the authors, but the case of Morris v. Beardsmore which
is cited as authority was reported in 1980 and should surely
have been unearthed in the course of research.
Apart from these scholarly difficulties, it is the contention
of this paper that the analysis suggested by McLeod is legally
incorrect. The Report attaches great significance to the case
of R. v. Waterfield and indeed it adopts the Waterfield test
as the appropriate measuring stick of police illegality. However,
the test in Waterfield must be interpreted in light of the facts
and the result in the case. Following Waterfield, which was
decided in 1964, the law has continued to evolve while
maintaining the position that the law of police powers is
authority and not expediency based. The test in Waterfield turns
on the justifiable use of powers associated with duty. In order
to apply the test it is necessary to ascertain what authority
is associated with the duty in question. This is the approach
adopted by the Waterfield bench and numerous courts since
the decision. 23 If the test is used without initially ascertaining
the limit of existing authority it becomes meaningless. It is
submitted that the legal analysis presented here demonstrates
that no authority to infringe on protected rights of liberty or
property can be implied simply from the existence of duty. The
Report, in relying so heavily on an incomplete and misleading
interpretation of Waterfield to the exclusion of both ancient
and recent case law places its conclusions in doubt.
Finally, the McLeod Report attempts to buttress its duty/
authority analysis by relying on the statutory nature of the police
in Canada today. However, entrenched, traditional canons of
interpretation, Supreme Court and other judicial authority, and
a common sense approach to the statutes as a whole suggest
that it is incorrect to construe them as authority-granting. It
122. See, supra note 46.
123. See, for example Rice v. Connolly, Bentley v. Brudzinski, supra note
76; R. v. Dedman. supra note 92; R. v. Custer, supra note 53.
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seems clear that the various Police Acts are primarily
administrative in nature and that the duty-creating sections are
simple expositions of the traditional relationship between the
peace officer and the community he serves.
3. Policy Implications
The implications of the McLeod Report go far beyond a mere
technical adjustment of the existing law. The McLeod Report
is designed to cultivate an attitude that accepts police illegality
for the good of society as a whole. This approach diminishes
the rights of the average citizen and would provoke controversy
even if the document which advocated it was clear and
scrupulously thorough. Unfortunately, as demonstrated
throughout this criticism the legal analysis of the McLeod
Report is vulnerable in the extreme.
The success of the police in our society is dependent in large
part on the co-operation and trust of the public. 24 In the words
of Mr. Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that
are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that
the government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face. 25
Revelations of institutionalized RCMP wrongdoing were
greeted with widespread outcry and debate.12 6 As the agency
to which we have arguably granted the "greatest power and
124. See the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ouimet
Report), Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Correction (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1969).
125. Olmstead v. United States (1927), 277 U.S. 438 at 485, 48 Sup. Ct.
Rptr. 564 at 575.
126. See, supra notes I and 5,
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widest discretion to interfere in our lives" 27 the police cannot
be seen to disregard the law which they are empowered to
enforce.
The Report suggests that for a number of the procedures
investigated an appropriate response to the criticism leveled
by the McDonald Commission would be the formulation of
new and accurate policy guidelines. However, by defining police
power by guidelines we define individual freedom by police
discretion. This article's brief consideration of the factual
circumstances leading up to the establishment of the McDonald
Commission suggests that the exercise of police discretion, no
matter how well intended, may lead to unsavoury results. The
Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ouimet
Report) 28 recognized the need for a clear and concise statement
of police power.
Police powers should not, however, require research to
but should be readily
ascertain their existence and extent,
129
ascertainable and clearly defined.
The existence of clearly defined police powers serves two
purposes. First, if a power is unambiguously created it suggests
that the legislature has turned its mind to the problem and
decided on the most appropriate course of action. Second, it
is essential that police powers be accessible and understandable
to the public which they are designed to protect. This promotes
public confidence in the police and also encourages co-operation
with their lawful activities. 30 In and of themselves policy
guidelines, however detailed, create no substantive rights. If
the rule of law is to have any significance it must mean that
the law is discoverable, open, clear and relatively stable and
3
therefore capable of guiding our behaviour.' '
Clearly, it is in the public interest that the police be given
the necessary authority to function effectively in their most
difficult task. However, "it is equally to the public good that
police power should be controlled and confined so as not to
127. See Cohen, supra note 114 at 634.
128. See, supra note 124.
129. Id. at 59.
130. In Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 699 (C.A.) Lord Denning wrote that
"the lawfulness of the conduct of the police must be judged at the time and
not by what happens afterwards" at 709.
131. See Cohen, supra note 114 at 633.
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interfere with personal freedom". 32 As a society we have
recognized and authorized police powers to search, seize, arrest,
detain and bear arms far exceeding the powers of the ordinary
citizen. We also recognize that the basic purposes of the criminal
law should be carried out with no more interference with the
freedom of individuals than is necessary. To achieve order we
are willing to pay a price in diminished civil liberties. However,
at some point individual interests must predominate. The
backdrop to this balancing process is the rule of law which
is essential both to the maintenance of civil liberties and the
establishment of an effective police force. In my opinion, the
overwhelming policy consideration in the exercise of police
power should be restraint. 33 The state should intervene only
when and to the extent which such intervention is clearly
authorized by law. Documents such as the McLeod Report
imply that "law and order" will be more readily achieved if
we simply allow the police to act outside the law in certain
situations. In the words of one author:
The danger is not that our few prized liberties will expire
in some loud, anguished and bloody battle, but rather that
by steady
by slow degrees, by slight turnings of the screw,
34
constant erosion, they will silently disappear.1
Conclusion
The McLeod Report is both surprising and dangerous.
Surprising, because one would expect a high level of intellectual
rigour from authors with such senior positions in our system
of justice. Dangerous, because it encourages an ethos towards
police power which is at odds with the tradition of the common
law without providing sound authority for its position. In
addition, the very existence of the Report suggests that senior
officials within our system of justice are becoming advocates
132. J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial(1966) at 10.
133. See generally the Ouimet Report, supra note 124, Our Criminal Law,
Law Reform Commission of Canada Report, March 1976, particularly 19-

30, and The Criminal Law in Canadian Society, Government of Canada,
Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, August 1982, particularly 37-51. At 51 the Report
states: "It seems justifiable and appropriate to endorse the general policy

of restraint in criminal law, on the understanding that 'restraint' is a shorthand
way of referring to principles of justice, necessity and economy."
134. See Cohen, supra note 114 at 633.
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for government policy rather than impartial representatives of
the existing law. This paper has attempted to outline the serious
flaws in the McLeod Report while demonstrating the need for
intense scrutiny of this type of advocacy document. It is hoped
that the reader will accept the reasonableness and the necessity
of the traditional common law approach to police authority;
that is that every infringement of individual liberty or property
by a person in authority must be justified by a rule of positive
and unambiguous law. This simple principle is a cornerstone
of our Anglo-Canadian legal heritage articulated in Entick v.
Carrington, reflected in the modern day concept of the rule
of law and reaffirmed with few exceptions in both English and
Canadian courts. Public outcry or political embarrassment over
institutionalized police wrongdoing does not justify the
abandonment of a principle intrinsic to the relationship of the
individual with the state. What is perhaps most troubling about
the McLeod Report is not that the authors wish to state their
preference for a particular policy regarding police powers,
although this is troubling enough. Rather, it is the fact that
what is clearly an advocacy document is presented as a concise
statement of the existing law. It would be extremely unfortunate
if fundamental policy decisions on the law of police powers
were made on the basis of an inaccurate and inadequate
understanding of the present law. As a society we are entitled
to have such crucial questions determined against a backdrop
of thorough and rigorous legal scholarship.

